Talmidav Shel Aharon
5-5768: Mitzvah 74
November 19, 2007
Mitzvah 74 – It is a positive commandment of “sending away from the nest.”
Hafetz Hayim: Which means that if someone finds a bird’s nest on the way, with the mother-bird sitting on the fledglings or on the eggs, and he wishes to take them, he as to send away the mother-bird first and take them afterward; for Scripture says, “you shall surely send the dam away” (Deut. 22:7) and afterward, “and the young you may take for yourself.” (Ibid) The way to send it off is by taking hold of its wings and making it fly. If one sent it away and it returned, even many times, he is yet obligated to send it off. If it was flying about, if its wings touched the nest, he would have the duty to send it away; and if not, he would be free of any obligation to send it off. The requirement of “sending away from the nest” applies only to a pure (kosher) fowl, and one which is not prepared (not in his possession – which means that a person finds it on the way in some tree or on the ground); and specifically with fledglings which do not fly as yet and need their mother-bird, or with eggs that are not infertile and rotting. If a person transgresses and takes the mother-bird with the young, he is to fulfill the positive commandment and send the dam off. If he ritually slew the mother-bird or it died before he sent it off, so that he can no longer fulfill the positive commandment, he has thus violated a negative commandment. So likewise if someone came along and seized the mother-bird from his hand and sent it away, or it fled out of his hand without his knowledge (against his wish)- he is to receive whiplashes for violating the negative commandment, since he plainly did not observe the positive commandment. If he took the mother-bird and clipped its wings so that it could not fly and then he sent it off, he should be given whiplashes for disobedience, and he is to keep it with him until its wings grow back, and then he is to send it away. It applies everywhere and in every time for both men and women.
The Torah is very clear on this law. That is why the Hafetz Hayim is so direct about it. It is one of the few laws in the Torah that have a reward for observance. The Torah insists that one who sends the mother-bird away will live a long life.
This is one of a series of laws that are part of the rules concerning “Tzar Baalei Hayyim” “Pain given to animals”. The Torah understands that if we are cruel to animals, than it becomes easier to be cruel to each other. A mother-bird will defend her eggs and fledglings, a sign that she has “maternal” concerns for her offspring. It would be cruel not to push the mother aside and take her eggs. It would be cruel to the mother bird, and an act of cruelty on out part if we fail in this task. If we can be so cruel to another animal, it is only fitting that such a person receives lashes for his or her insensitivity. Perhaps the pain suffered by lashes will help instill a kind of concern for the pain he or she causes others, human and animal. As an act of kindness to animals, we send away the mother-bird, we don’t cook a baby animal in its mother’s milk and we don’t yoke an ox with a donkey when plowing since the stronger one will have to drag along the weaker animal. We don’t even allow the muzzling of an ox on the threshing floor since to be working with the grain and not allowed to eat it would also be cruel to the ox. We have to be sensitive to the needs of our animals like we would want to be sensitive to the needs of those humans who work for us.
I would be remiss if I did not mention the way this law of the mother-bird was used for a larger problem in Jewish Law. The reward for sending the dam away is that you receive long life. The story is that Rabbi Elisha ben Abulya was walking one day and saw a man holding a ladder by a tree. His son was on the ladder reaching for a bird’s nest. The father said, “Remember to send the mother bird away” and the Rabbi noted that this child would live a long time since he was obeying two commandments that have the same reward, Sending the mother bird away, and honoring parents both have the reward of long life. The boy sent the mother bird away, and then, tragically, he lost his footing, fell from the tree and died. It is said that this was the cause that caused Rabbi Elisha ben Abulya to become an apostate. G-d had not fulfilled the reward and suddenly the Rabbi could no longer believe in G-d. If G-d could not be relied upon to fulfill the reward, then “There is no Judge and there is no Justice” thus Elisha abandoned his faith. (There is a classic book on this issue, “As a Driven Leaf” by Milton Steinberg. This moment is the center of the book and it deals with the issues of G-d in the world and our experience of G-d. It is one of my favorite books of all time)
The issue has not gone away after all these years. Why bad things happen to good people is one of the realities of our world and it insures that our faith is always subject to question and debate. Can we believe in G-d in spite of the injustice of this world? If not, how is faith possible? If we can, how can we explain the injustice? Abraham’s demand that “The Judge of the world act justly” is a cornerstone of Judaism. Without it all of Jewish Law is impossible. There are many answers that have been come forth over the centuries. If we are to be secure in our faith, we will need to find an answer for ourselves lest we slide into heresy, as did Elisha. The stakes are very high, and we will need to be honest and considered in our answers. I don’t have an answer for you; Judaism demands that you study to find the answer that works best for you.
Monday, November 19, 2007
Sunday, November 11, 2007
4-5768: Mitzvah 73
Talmidav Shel Aharon
4-5768: Mitzvah 73
November 11, 2007
Mitzvah 73 – It is a positive commandment to render judgment about heritages [inheritance of landed property]
Hafetz Hayim: As Scripture says, “If a man dies and has no son, then you shall transfer his inheritance to his daughter.” (Num. 27:8). However, a son has priority over a daughter; and all one’s male descendants have priority over a daughter. A daughter and all her male descendants take priority over the dead man’s father. Included in this commandment is the rule that a firstborn son is to inherit a double share of the legacy. And a husband inherits his wife’s property buy the law of the Sages, taking precedence over all others in her legacy. It applies everywhere and in every time.
The Torah is very clear about the laws of inheritance. Only sons can inherit from their father. Their first responsibility is to their unmarried sisters and they must provide for them until all the daughters are married even if it means the sons must go begging in the street. If there are no sons, then grandsons inherit down the male line. If there are no male descendants, then the legacy passes down to the daughters according to the ruling given to the daughters of Zelofchad in the Book of Numbers. If the daughter has died, it goes down her male descendants. If there are none, than the man’s father is next to inherit. It goes down his male line.
According to the Torah, the legacy is divided into equal parts according to the number of sons (or daughters if there are none) and the firstborn son gets a double portion and the rest get a single portion. Thus if there are three sons, the estate is divided into four equal parts, two going to the firstborn and one each to the other two sons.
Finally, the Sages noted that there is nothing in the Torah about what happens to a wife’s estate when she dies. They ruled that her entire estate is transferred to her husband upon her death. This assumes that she dies before her husband. If he dies first, she keeps her property and collects the 200 zuzim in land that is promised in her ketubah. This legacy is paid even before the sons inherit. It is the first charge against the estate, even before his other creditors.
This is how Jewish law deals with inheritance. There is no probate and the order cannot be changed. Yet we note that Jacob buys the birthright, the double portion from Esau and both Abraham (who gives the double portion to Isaac and not Ishmael) and Jacob (who gives the double portion to Joseph not Reuvan) ignore this law.
Modern Jewish Law avoids this whole arrangement by using the common will that acts as if the person will give his estate away as a gift to whomever he wishes and there is then nothing for anyone to inherit. In general, financial matters such as these follow the rules of the lands in which Jews live unless they have ritual significance. The laws of inheritance do not and that is why, while they remain in effect, they are most often ignored and an estate is divided according to the wishes expressed in the will of the deceased.
I am sure that if you are or were an attorney with a practice in family law, than all of this may be historically interesting. I am not aware that there is anyone today, who follows these laws.
4-5768: Mitzvah 73
November 11, 2007
Mitzvah 73 – It is a positive commandment to render judgment about heritages [inheritance of landed property]
Hafetz Hayim: As Scripture says, “If a man dies and has no son, then you shall transfer his inheritance to his daughter.” (Num. 27:8). However, a son has priority over a daughter; and all one’s male descendants have priority over a daughter. A daughter and all her male descendants take priority over the dead man’s father. Included in this commandment is the rule that a firstborn son is to inherit a double share of the legacy. And a husband inherits his wife’s property buy the law of the Sages, taking precedence over all others in her legacy. It applies everywhere and in every time.
The Torah is very clear about the laws of inheritance. Only sons can inherit from their father. Their first responsibility is to their unmarried sisters and they must provide for them until all the daughters are married even if it means the sons must go begging in the street. If there are no sons, then grandsons inherit down the male line. If there are no male descendants, then the legacy passes down to the daughters according to the ruling given to the daughters of Zelofchad in the Book of Numbers. If the daughter has died, it goes down her male descendants. If there are none, than the man’s father is next to inherit. It goes down his male line.
According to the Torah, the legacy is divided into equal parts according to the number of sons (or daughters if there are none) and the firstborn son gets a double portion and the rest get a single portion. Thus if there are three sons, the estate is divided into four equal parts, two going to the firstborn and one each to the other two sons.
Finally, the Sages noted that there is nothing in the Torah about what happens to a wife’s estate when she dies. They ruled that her entire estate is transferred to her husband upon her death. This assumes that she dies before her husband. If he dies first, she keeps her property and collects the 200 zuzim in land that is promised in her ketubah. This legacy is paid even before the sons inherit. It is the first charge against the estate, even before his other creditors.
This is how Jewish law deals with inheritance. There is no probate and the order cannot be changed. Yet we note that Jacob buys the birthright, the double portion from Esau and both Abraham (who gives the double portion to Isaac and not Ishmael) and Jacob (who gives the double portion to Joseph not Reuvan) ignore this law.
Modern Jewish Law avoids this whole arrangement by using the common will that acts as if the person will give his estate away as a gift to whomever he wishes and there is then nothing for anyone to inherit. In general, financial matters such as these follow the rules of the lands in which Jews live unless they have ritual significance. The laws of inheritance do not and that is why, while they remain in effect, they are most often ignored and an estate is divided according to the wishes expressed in the will of the deceased.
I am sure that if you are or were an attorney with a practice in family law, than all of this may be historically interesting. I am not aware that there is anyone today, who follows these laws.
Monday, October 22, 2007
3-5768: Mitzvah 72
Talmidav Shel Aharon
3-5768: Mitzvah 72
October 22, 2007
Mitzvah 72 – It is a positive commandment to upbraid a sinner
Hafetz Hayim: As Scripture says, “you shall surely rebuke your fellow.” (Lev. 19:17). He is to inform him that he does himself a wrong by his evil acts; and he is to inform him that he is telling hi this only for his own benefit, to bring him to life in the world-to-come. It is his duty to reprimand him until he listens to him, or until he strikes him and says “I will not listen to you.” There are some early authorities who are lenient about this, holding that it is enough until there is an angry retort [that the other gives us in rejecting our efforts]. But even the first view applies specifically when the person violates a prohibition by Torah law, and when he estimates that it will be effective for the future, that the other person will not do this thing again. Even a person of lower stature is duty-bound to rebuke a person of higher stature. Whoever has it in his power to oppose a sinner in his act and does not do so, fall victim to the guilt of is sin. Now, even though it is a religious duty to rebuke him [a sinner], he should not shame him first. It is a religious requirement to accept rebuke and to bear the chastiser affection. We find in the teachings of the Sages “that even if a person willfully violates a prohibition enacted by the Sages, it is permissible to call him a transgressor. It applies everywhere and in every time for both men and women.
This is a very difficult Mitzvah to perform because it has so many problems that can become attached to it. Let me first deal with the mechanics of the Mitzvah and then try and explain the problems.
This Mitzvah, on the surface is very straightforward. If we find someone whom we see is engaged in a violation of a Torah commandment, we have the obligation (not choice) to rebuke the actions of the person sinning and to try and get that person to do the right thing and not sin. It is so easy to sin and think that everyone is doing the same. When someone rebukes a sinner, that sinner can no longer think that his actions do not really matter. The idea is not to make anyone mad, but to get that person to contemplate his or her actions and to get them to do what is right. Such a person should really thank the one rebuking for saving his portion in the world to come. Additionally, it is possible to do a Mitzvah by mistake, but one must have intention to perform a sin. Rebuking a sinner forces that person to either change his or her ways or to affirm that it is his or her intention to sin, and thus they can no longer plead ignorance or error for their actions.
The first problem we detect with this Mitzvah is the intentions of the one who is doing the Rebuke. The rules of rebuking demand first of all, that the rebuke will have some effect on the Sinner. If the correction will be ignored, reviled or cause anger, than it is better to keep quiet and not rebuke. All the more so if the sinner is known to react violently to rebuke and could injure the one rebuking. Second, the one rebuking should have no vested interest in the sinner either continuing to sin or in changing his ways. If there is a hint of self-interest in the rebuke, someone else should do the rebuking. We don’t build ourselves up by tearing someone else down.
Not every sin is worthy of a rebuke. While we don’t try to rank one Mitzvah as being more important over another, note that the Hafetz Hayyim limits to rebuke to a violation of a Mitzvah from the Torah. Remember there is clear disagreement between Sages as to what some Mitzvot include. One does not rebuke another for following a different authority in Jewish law. So if a person does not hear the Shofar on Rosh Hashana one can “remind” that person that it is a Mitzvah to hear the Shofar. One should not, however, rebuke someone who is listening to the Shofar on Rosh Hashana, because he heard the Shofar in a synagogue where the one rebuking would not pray. Similarly one can rebuke someone who is eating forbidden meat, but not one who is eating food supervised by a Kashrut authority that the one who is rebuking does not accept.
There are authorities today, who feel that the whole rebuking process seems to be a very self-righteous way to act. There are many sinners today and rather than rebuke them, they should be treated as if they are someone who never had the chance to study and practice Jewish law. In other words, they are not sinners, just not fully aware of the complexities of Jewish law. Finally, no matter if one meets all the restrictions above and feels that, in this case, rebuke may help lift a person to live a better life, than rebuke may be given but always beware to give rebuke respectfully, honestly, sincerely and with great kindness. It should be a learning experience for the sinner and not ever be a source of embarrassment or shame. To shame a fellow human being is as close to committing murder as one can get without actually spilling blood. When we rebuke, we must carefully weigh and watch our words.
3-5768: Mitzvah 72
October 22, 2007
Mitzvah 72 – It is a positive commandment to upbraid a sinner
Hafetz Hayim: As Scripture says, “you shall surely rebuke your fellow.” (Lev. 19:17). He is to inform him that he does himself a wrong by his evil acts; and he is to inform him that he is telling hi this only for his own benefit, to bring him to life in the world-to-come. It is his duty to reprimand him until he listens to him, or until he strikes him and says “I will not listen to you.” There are some early authorities who are lenient about this, holding that it is enough until there is an angry retort [that the other gives us in rejecting our efforts]. But even the first view applies specifically when the person violates a prohibition by Torah law, and when he estimates that it will be effective for the future, that the other person will not do this thing again. Even a person of lower stature is duty-bound to rebuke a person of higher stature. Whoever has it in his power to oppose a sinner in his act and does not do so, fall victim to the guilt of is sin. Now, even though it is a religious duty to rebuke him [a sinner], he should not shame him first. It is a religious requirement to accept rebuke and to bear the chastiser affection. We find in the teachings of the Sages “that even if a person willfully violates a prohibition enacted by the Sages, it is permissible to call him a transgressor. It applies everywhere and in every time for both men and women.
This is a very difficult Mitzvah to perform because it has so many problems that can become attached to it. Let me first deal with the mechanics of the Mitzvah and then try and explain the problems.
This Mitzvah, on the surface is very straightforward. If we find someone whom we see is engaged in a violation of a Torah commandment, we have the obligation (not choice) to rebuke the actions of the person sinning and to try and get that person to do the right thing and not sin. It is so easy to sin and think that everyone is doing the same. When someone rebukes a sinner, that sinner can no longer think that his actions do not really matter. The idea is not to make anyone mad, but to get that person to contemplate his or her actions and to get them to do what is right. Such a person should really thank the one rebuking for saving his portion in the world to come. Additionally, it is possible to do a Mitzvah by mistake, but one must have intention to perform a sin. Rebuking a sinner forces that person to either change his or her ways or to affirm that it is his or her intention to sin, and thus they can no longer plead ignorance or error for their actions.
The first problem we detect with this Mitzvah is the intentions of the one who is doing the Rebuke. The rules of rebuking demand first of all, that the rebuke will have some effect on the Sinner. If the correction will be ignored, reviled or cause anger, than it is better to keep quiet and not rebuke. All the more so if the sinner is known to react violently to rebuke and could injure the one rebuking. Second, the one rebuking should have no vested interest in the sinner either continuing to sin or in changing his ways. If there is a hint of self-interest in the rebuke, someone else should do the rebuking. We don’t build ourselves up by tearing someone else down.
Not every sin is worthy of a rebuke. While we don’t try to rank one Mitzvah as being more important over another, note that the Hafetz Hayyim limits to rebuke to a violation of a Mitzvah from the Torah. Remember there is clear disagreement between Sages as to what some Mitzvot include. One does not rebuke another for following a different authority in Jewish law. So if a person does not hear the Shofar on Rosh Hashana one can “remind” that person that it is a Mitzvah to hear the Shofar. One should not, however, rebuke someone who is listening to the Shofar on Rosh Hashana, because he heard the Shofar in a synagogue where the one rebuking would not pray. Similarly one can rebuke someone who is eating forbidden meat, but not one who is eating food supervised by a Kashrut authority that the one who is rebuking does not accept.
There are authorities today, who feel that the whole rebuking process seems to be a very self-righteous way to act. There are many sinners today and rather than rebuke them, they should be treated as if they are someone who never had the chance to study and practice Jewish law. In other words, they are not sinners, just not fully aware of the complexities of Jewish law. Finally, no matter if one meets all the restrictions above and feels that, in this case, rebuke may help lift a person to live a better life, than rebuke may be given but always beware to give rebuke respectfully, honestly, sincerely and with great kindness. It should be a learning experience for the sinner and not ever be a source of embarrassment or shame. To shame a fellow human being is as close to committing murder as one can get without actually spilling blood. When we rebuke, we must carefully weigh and watch our words.
Monday, October 15, 2007
2-5768: Mitzvah 71
Talmidav Shel Aharon
2-5768: Mitzvah 71
October 15, 2007
Mitzvah 71 – It is a positive commandment to load with one’s fellow man, to set a burden on a domestic animal or on the person.
Hafetz Hayim: As Scripture says, “you shall surely help him lift them up.” (Deut. 22:4). If one left him and went his own way without helping him, he disobeyed a positive commandment. However, an elder for whom it is beneath his dignity is free of the duty. If, though, had it been his own he would have unloaded and loaded the burden, he is duty bound likewise with the burden of his fellow man. If he wishes to go beyond the strict letter of the law, he may unload or load it even if it is not in accord with his dignity; and may blessing come upon him.
If a person faced both the religious duty of unloading and the duty of loading, unloading takes priority because of the pain of the living creature. However, if the one needing his burden loaded was a person whom he disliked, and the other was a friend, it is a religious duty to help the disliked person first, so as to discipline his inclination. The disliked person mentioned here means someone whom he saw, when alone, committing a sing, whereupon he warned him but the other did not turn back. It is then a religious duty to hate him. Nevertheless he is to load and unload with him; for the other might delay on account of his items of monetary value and thus come into some danger. And it is proper to save him, since he does not believe I the main principles of our faith.
Loading is to be done specifically if the other pays him a fee for it; but for nothing there is no obligation to do loading. It applies everywhere and in every time for both men and women.
This Mitzvah is the flip side of the one from last week. There are two Mitzvot, one to help unload an animal that has fallen under its burden. That burden then needs to be reloaded, either in a different way so the animal can carry it, or onto another animal that may not have as much to carry or on the back of the owner.
Unloading always has priority since it also involves saving an animal from pain and suffering. Loading, however, is more about caring for our fellow human beings. Just like last week, an elder who does not want to sully his dignity does not have to help load the animal of another, but if he is traveling with aides, he can instruct them to help. If he also travels with animals and, from time to time has to reload them, then he must help others in need by the side of the road. If he has not reason to stop and stops anyway, this is acting above the letter of the law and such a man will be praised. People who are stuck on the side of the road are in grave danger of falling prey to robbers and vandals of all kind. To help them get back on their way is, in many cases, participating in saving a life.
There is also a special part of this Mitzvah that involves helping an enemy before a friend. Other sages note that when you stop to help an enemy load his animal, he may think that he has not judged you correctly and it is possible that the two of you may end the hard feelings between you. I have to pause here to comment on the Hafetz Hayim and his definition of an “enemy”. The definition he gives is one who sins in spite of being warned that such an action is prohibited. A person who spitefully sins is not the kind of person someone who loves G-d wants to be near. I am not sure that I would say that such a person should be “hated”. Many Sages insist that those who sin today are not acting out of spite for the law, rather they just don’t know any better. I also assume that this could be the only person the law would allow you to hate. Anger is permitted for a day or two, but we have a big Mitzvah to forgive those who offend us so that we do not hate them for long.
I am not sure what the rule is on being paid. I admit that this seems strange to me. I can only guess that since there were people who were paid to help load an animal that the owner of the load could try and bypass paying such people by doing it himself and when it fall apart anyway, expecting those who he meets on the road to retie the load for free. Thus if he is on the road, he still needs to pay those who help him load up the animal again.
2-5768: Mitzvah 71
October 15, 2007
Mitzvah 71 – It is a positive commandment to load with one’s fellow man, to set a burden on a domestic animal or on the person.
Hafetz Hayim: As Scripture says, “you shall surely help him lift them up.” (Deut. 22:4). If one left him and went his own way without helping him, he disobeyed a positive commandment. However, an elder for whom it is beneath his dignity is free of the duty. If, though, had it been his own he would have unloaded and loaded the burden, he is duty bound likewise with the burden of his fellow man. If he wishes to go beyond the strict letter of the law, he may unload or load it even if it is not in accord with his dignity; and may blessing come upon him.
If a person faced both the religious duty of unloading and the duty of loading, unloading takes priority because of the pain of the living creature. However, if the one needing his burden loaded was a person whom he disliked, and the other was a friend, it is a religious duty to help the disliked person first, so as to discipline his inclination. The disliked person mentioned here means someone whom he saw, when alone, committing a sing, whereupon he warned him but the other did not turn back. It is then a religious duty to hate him. Nevertheless he is to load and unload with him; for the other might delay on account of his items of monetary value and thus come into some danger. And it is proper to save him, since he does not believe I the main principles of our faith.
Loading is to be done specifically if the other pays him a fee for it; but for nothing there is no obligation to do loading. It applies everywhere and in every time for both men and women.
This Mitzvah is the flip side of the one from last week. There are two Mitzvot, one to help unload an animal that has fallen under its burden. That burden then needs to be reloaded, either in a different way so the animal can carry it, or onto another animal that may not have as much to carry or on the back of the owner.
Unloading always has priority since it also involves saving an animal from pain and suffering. Loading, however, is more about caring for our fellow human beings. Just like last week, an elder who does not want to sully his dignity does not have to help load the animal of another, but if he is traveling with aides, he can instruct them to help. If he also travels with animals and, from time to time has to reload them, then he must help others in need by the side of the road. If he has not reason to stop and stops anyway, this is acting above the letter of the law and such a man will be praised. People who are stuck on the side of the road are in grave danger of falling prey to robbers and vandals of all kind. To help them get back on their way is, in many cases, participating in saving a life.
There is also a special part of this Mitzvah that involves helping an enemy before a friend. Other sages note that when you stop to help an enemy load his animal, he may think that he has not judged you correctly and it is possible that the two of you may end the hard feelings between you. I have to pause here to comment on the Hafetz Hayim and his definition of an “enemy”. The definition he gives is one who sins in spite of being warned that such an action is prohibited. A person who spitefully sins is not the kind of person someone who loves G-d wants to be near. I am not sure that I would say that such a person should be “hated”. Many Sages insist that those who sin today are not acting out of spite for the law, rather they just don’t know any better. I also assume that this could be the only person the law would allow you to hate. Anger is permitted for a day or two, but we have a big Mitzvah to forgive those who offend us so that we do not hate them for long.
I am not sure what the rule is on being paid. I admit that this seems strange to me. I can only guess that since there were people who were paid to help load an animal that the owner of the load could try and bypass paying such people by doing it himself and when it fall apart anyway, expecting those who he meets on the road to retie the load for free. Thus if he is on the road, he still needs to pay those who help him load up the animal again.
Wednesday, October 10, 2007
1-5768: Mitzvah 70
Talmidav Shel Aharon
1-5768: Mitzvah 70
August 20, 2007
I am beginning now another year of my online study. What began as a lesson mailed to a few friends, is now a permanent blog with archives of all the previous lessons. I thank all of you who have taken the time to read and comment on my teachings for joining me in this study of Judaism and Jewish Law. May G-d bless our efforts in the New Year.
Mitzvah 70 – It is a positive commandment to unload fro the domestic animal of one’s fellow-human being that is lying under its burden.
Hafetz Hayim: As Scripture says, “if you see the donkey of one that you hate lying under its burden …you shall surely help with him.” (Exodus. 23:5). – even if there was on it a larger load that was fit for it. It is one’s duty to unload it for nothing, without payment. However, an elder for whom it is beneath his dignity is free of the obligation. If one unloaded and reloaded [the animal] and it fell down again, he is duty-bound to unload and load it back on yet another time, and even a hundred times, as Scripture says, “you shall surely help with him”. And he as to walk with him as far as a parasang {to make sure all is now in order] unless the owner of the load says, “I do not need you.” It applies everywhere and in every time for both men and women.
There are two different reasons for this Mitzvah. The first is an issue of Tzar Baalai Hayyim, or Kindness to Animals. Since animals were the main beasts of burden, (esp. donkeys) it is possible to load them up with more stuff than they are able to carry. If the animal can’t carry the load, it will collapse under the weight or just refuse to carry it. At the beginning or end of the journey, there will be helpers to load and unload the animal, but on the road, only the owner of the load or the owner of the animal (it could be the same person) is present and reloading the animal requires more than two hands. It is in the animal interest to have the load redistributed so that it is easier to carry or that some of the load be transferred to a stronger animal. The animal can’t talk to us, so it is a matter of trial and error, but we need to keep up the process until the animal can carry the load placed on its back.
The other reason for the mitzvah has to do with caring about our fellow human beings. We can’t just ignore a person in need. Even if that person is an enemy or one that we hate, we must stop and lend a hand. Perhaps it will lead to reconciliation, but even if it does not, we still have the responsibility to help. It is certain that if we do not help but just walk on by, we will not be making any new friends, and our enemies will hate us even more. We are not to ask for any pay for helping a person in distress. There are some who say that this therefore would apply to seeing a person who has a broken down car by the side of the road. We cannot just drive by, but must help change the tire or do what we can to help the person get back on the road. We become the roadside assistant that the other person needs. There is a danger her. It is well known that there are some nefarious people who use a broken down car to lure unsuspecting drivers to stop and be robbed or worse. But in the middle of the day in the middle of the city, others may drive by but we should at least stop and offer to call for help, as long as we don’t endanger ourselves.
The Hafetz Hayyim also notes that an elderly person or someone infirm or unable to help, does not need to stop and help with a job that is clearly beyond his or her capacities. We should stop and do what we can, even if it means only getting someone else to come and help.
A Parasang is a “Persian Mile” it equals 8,000 cubits or about 2.4 miles or 3.84 km.
1-5768: Mitzvah 70
August 20, 2007
I am beginning now another year of my online study. What began as a lesson mailed to a few friends, is now a permanent blog with archives of all the previous lessons. I thank all of you who have taken the time to read and comment on my teachings for joining me in this study of Judaism and Jewish Law. May G-d bless our efforts in the New Year.
Mitzvah 70 – It is a positive commandment to unload fro the domestic animal of one’s fellow-human being that is lying under its burden.
Hafetz Hayim: As Scripture says, “if you see the donkey of one that you hate lying under its burden …you shall surely help with him.” (Exodus. 23:5). – even if there was on it a larger load that was fit for it. It is one’s duty to unload it for nothing, without payment. However, an elder for whom it is beneath his dignity is free of the obligation. If one unloaded and reloaded [the animal] and it fell down again, he is duty-bound to unload and load it back on yet another time, and even a hundred times, as Scripture says, “you shall surely help with him”. And he as to walk with him as far as a parasang {to make sure all is now in order] unless the owner of the load says, “I do not need you.” It applies everywhere and in every time for both men and women.
There are two different reasons for this Mitzvah. The first is an issue of Tzar Baalai Hayyim, or Kindness to Animals. Since animals were the main beasts of burden, (esp. donkeys) it is possible to load them up with more stuff than they are able to carry. If the animal can’t carry the load, it will collapse under the weight or just refuse to carry it. At the beginning or end of the journey, there will be helpers to load and unload the animal, but on the road, only the owner of the load or the owner of the animal (it could be the same person) is present and reloading the animal requires more than two hands. It is in the animal interest to have the load redistributed so that it is easier to carry or that some of the load be transferred to a stronger animal. The animal can’t talk to us, so it is a matter of trial and error, but we need to keep up the process until the animal can carry the load placed on its back.
The other reason for the mitzvah has to do with caring about our fellow human beings. We can’t just ignore a person in need. Even if that person is an enemy or one that we hate, we must stop and lend a hand. Perhaps it will lead to reconciliation, but even if it does not, we still have the responsibility to help. It is certain that if we do not help but just walk on by, we will not be making any new friends, and our enemies will hate us even more. We are not to ask for any pay for helping a person in distress. There are some who say that this therefore would apply to seeing a person who has a broken down car by the side of the road. We cannot just drive by, but must help change the tire or do what we can to help the person get back on the road. We become the roadside assistant that the other person needs. There is a danger her. It is well known that there are some nefarious people who use a broken down car to lure unsuspecting drivers to stop and be robbed or worse. But in the middle of the day in the middle of the city, others may drive by but we should at least stop and offer to call for help, as long as we don’t endanger ourselves.
The Hafetz Hayyim also notes that an elderly person or someone infirm or unable to help, does not need to stop and help with a job that is clearly beyond his or her capacities. We should stop and do what we can, even if it means only getting someone else to come and help.
A Parasang is a “Persian Mile” it equals 8,000 cubits or about 2.4 miles or 3.84 km.
Monday, August 20, 2007
35-5767: Mitzvah 69
Talmidav Shel Aharon
35-5767: Mitzvah 69
August 20, 2007
Mitzvah 69 – It is a positive commandment to return something lost to a member of Jewry
Hafetz Hayim: As Scripture says, “you shall surely bring them back to your brother” (Deut. 22:1). If one turned a blind eye to it, he disobeyed a positive commandment and violated a negative one. If he took the lost object and did not return it, he also disobeyed this positive commandment and violated two prohibitions. It is a religious duty to return a lost object even to a wicked person. But if someone eats non-Kosher meat out of spite and defiance, or he violates the Sabbath openly, he is a heretic, and it is forbidden to return a lost object to him. If a person finds something with which it would be beneath his dignity to bother, and were it his own he would not trouble himself with it, he has no duty to bother with this. If, however, he wishes to act beyond the strict line or letter of the law, he may do so, and may blessing come upon him. Now, Rabbenu Yona wrote: If it is a religious duty to devote effort to rescue another person’s items of monetary value, how much more certainly must we expend effort to rescue him himself, to do something to save him in his time of distress. It applies everywhere and in every time for both men and women.
In Judaism, one is not allowed to say, “I don’t want to get involved.” We have duties to G-d and we have duties to ourselves and we also have duties to our society. This is one of them. A lost object may be of little interest to me, but I can not just ignore it and walk on by. I have an obligation by this commandment to protect that which was lost and make a proper attempt to locate the owner. If the object is properly labeled with the name of the owner, I have to search out and find the owner and return his object in as good a condition as I found it. I can not allow it to become any more damaged than it already may be and, if I keep the object for any real length of time, and I am fixing my own similar objects, I should fix the lost property as well.
If the object found has no name on it, but it does have marks by which it can be identified, than we must publicize the finding of the object and ask those who would claim it as their own, to describe the identifying marks. For example, if jewelry were found, all that needs to be done is to announce that “a bracelet” was found and those who come to claim it can describe it in order to identify it.
If the object has no name on it or marks that could identify it, than I do not have the obligation to seek the owner. It is assumed that the owner has written it off as lost, and therefore it should be considered ownerless and the finder can keep it. For example, cash that is lost but not in a wallet or identifiable purse, that has no unusual marks on the bill, could not be returned because all money looks alike and there is no way to identify the true owner.
If the object is not worth saving, that is, it is so inconsequential that there is just no point in returning it, than we do not need to return it. If you find an old pair of beach shoes in the sand, and they could be identified but clearly the person who left them would not come back to find them, they could simply buy themselves a new pair, then we have no obligation for returning the object at all. If the owner did come and ask about it, it would probably be more charitable to buy him or her a new pair of shoes.
If I find an object that should be returned, and I don’t try to find the owner, I am in violation of this law and the law that insists that we don’t ignore the property of our neighbor. If I take the object and don’t seek the owner, I violate those laws and the law of robbery as well. I have kept something that does not belong to me.
The owner of the object does not matter. If we know who it belongs to, we have to return it, even if that person is our enemy, or if that person is wicked. As for the heretic, since he as separated himself from the community, he does not get the benefits of being a part of the community. The issue of eating treif meat or violating Shabbat should not be taken literally since these are very subjective Mitzvot. You may not keep my level of Kashrut or do what I do on Shabbat but that does not make one a heretic. If one denies G-d, than such a person is outside the community. As a Conservative Jew, I am not so sure that I would be so quick to brand someone a heretic or not to return an object that was once owned by a non-Jew. In all cases, retuning lost property is a great Mitzvah and even if we don’t have the obligation to return it, if we do so, we are praised for going above the letter of the law. At the end, we are reminded that if it is so important that we return lost property to a person, how much more important it must be if we save a person from distress, danger and trouble. We just cannot sit by and let someone else save the person. The only restriction on this is if saving someone else would endanger out lives. We are not obligated to save anyone or anything if, by saving him, her or it, we would be endangering our lives.
35-5767: Mitzvah 69
August 20, 2007
Mitzvah 69 – It is a positive commandment to return something lost to a member of Jewry
Hafetz Hayim: As Scripture says, “you shall surely bring them back to your brother” (Deut. 22:1). If one turned a blind eye to it, he disobeyed a positive commandment and violated a negative one. If he took the lost object and did not return it, he also disobeyed this positive commandment and violated two prohibitions. It is a religious duty to return a lost object even to a wicked person. But if someone eats non-Kosher meat out of spite and defiance, or he violates the Sabbath openly, he is a heretic, and it is forbidden to return a lost object to him. If a person finds something with which it would be beneath his dignity to bother, and were it his own he would not trouble himself with it, he has no duty to bother with this. If, however, he wishes to act beyond the strict line or letter of the law, he may do so, and may blessing come upon him. Now, Rabbenu Yona wrote: If it is a religious duty to devote effort to rescue another person’s items of monetary value, how much more certainly must we expend effort to rescue him himself, to do something to save him in his time of distress. It applies everywhere and in every time for both men and women.
In Judaism, one is not allowed to say, “I don’t want to get involved.” We have duties to G-d and we have duties to ourselves and we also have duties to our society. This is one of them. A lost object may be of little interest to me, but I can not just ignore it and walk on by. I have an obligation by this commandment to protect that which was lost and make a proper attempt to locate the owner. If the object is properly labeled with the name of the owner, I have to search out and find the owner and return his object in as good a condition as I found it. I can not allow it to become any more damaged than it already may be and, if I keep the object for any real length of time, and I am fixing my own similar objects, I should fix the lost property as well.
If the object found has no name on it, but it does have marks by which it can be identified, than we must publicize the finding of the object and ask those who would claim it as their own, to describe the identifying marks. For example, if jewelry were found, all that needs to be done is to announce that “a bracelet” was found and those who come to claim it can describe it in order to identify it.
If the object has no name on it or marks that could identify it, than I do not have the obligation to seek the owner. It is assumed that the owner has written it off as lost, and therefore it should be considered ownerless and the finder can keep it. For example, cash that is lost but not in a wallet or identifiable purse, that has no unusual marks on the bill, could not be returned because all money looks alike and there is no way to identify the true owner.
If the object is not worth saving, that is, it is so inconsequential that there is just no point in returning it, than we do not need to return it. If you find an old pair of beach shoes in the sand, and they could be identified but clearly the person who left them would not come back to find them, they could simply buy themselves a new pair, then we have no obligation for returning the object at all. If the owner did come and ask about it, it would probably be more charitable to buy him or her a new pair of shoes.
If I find an object that should be returned, and I don’t try to find the owner, I am in violation of this law and the law that insists that we don’t ignore the property of our neighbor. If I take the object and don’t seek the owner, I violate those laws and the law of robbery as well. I have kept something that does not belong to me.
The owner of the object does not matter. If we know who it belongs to, we have to return it, even if that person is our enemy, or if that person is wicked. As for the heretic, since he as separated himself from the community, he does not get the benefits of being a part of the community. The issue of eating treif meat or violating Shabbat should not be taken literally since these are very subjective Mitzvot. You may not keep my level of Kashrut or do what I do on Shabbat but that does not make one a heretic. If one denies G-d, than such a person is outside the community. As a Conservative Jew, I am not so sure that I would be so quick to brand someone a heretic or not to return an object that was once owned by a non-Jew. In all cases, retuning lost property is a great Mitzvah and even if we don’t have the obligation to return it, if we do so, we are praised for going above the letter of the law. At the end, we are reminded that if it is so important that we return lost property to a person, how much more important it must be if we save a person from distress, danger and trouble. We just cannot sit by and let someone else save the person. The only restriction on this is if saving someone else would endanger out lives. We are not obligated to save anyone or anything if, by saving him, her or it, we would be endangering our lives.
Wednesday, August 15, 2007
34-5767: Mitzvah 68
Talmidav Shel Aharon
34-5767: Mitzvah 68
August 14, 2007
Mitzvah 68 – It is a positive commandment to return whatever one has taken in robbery.
Hafetz Hayim: As Scripture says, “he shall restore what he took by robbery” (Lev.5:23). If a person seized by robbery something worth a perutah or more, he is to return it to the robbed person. If the robbed man has died, he is to return the seized object to the heirs. If the seized object is lost, he is to give its value in money. Included in this commandment there is also the duty of returning anything gained by theft or swindle. It applies everywhere and in every time for both men and women.
First of all, the definition of perutah is the smallest coin in the world of the ancient rabbis. Not only was it the smallest denomination of coin, but, as usual for the ancient world, it was also physically a small coin. The value of a coin was determined by the amount of the metal from which it was made. So larger coins were worth more than smaller ones.
Robbery is a crime. It is mentioned in the Bible and the penalty is, in some cases a fine of double the value of the stolen object if it is a moveable object. If it is cattle, the fine could increase to four or five times the value of the animal. No matter what the fine, the object that was stolen has to be returned to its owner. So, to be clear, robbery is not a mitzvah, but returning the seized object is. If the object is lost, than the value of the object is returned. And if the owner has died, it is to be returned to his heirs.
Finally, this law applies to all goods obtained illegally. If the object is not taken in an armed robbery but shoplifted, swiped, or gained by sleight of hand or by confusing the owner, than it still must be returned.
The point of all this is to insure that the person who stole the object could not benefit from his robbery. For example, if someone was the owner of a precious object and another offered him a fair price to buy it, but the owner declares that it is not for sale at any price since it has sentimental value. The buyer cannot steal it from the owner, and then pay the fine and keep the object. The object must also be returned. There is no difference if the object is valuable or not, one must return stolen goods.
This applies only to things that are moveable property. Real Estate that is stolen is a different category and the penalties are much higher since stealing property requires more effort. One must either move a boundary stone or pay witnesses to create a false bill of sale. Either way, it is a crime, in the bible against both human beings and G-d and a different set of laws applies.
This is a law designed to insure that “Crime does not pay”
34-5767: Mitzvah 68
August 14, 2007
Mitzvah 68 – It is a positive commandment to return whatever one has taken in robbery.
Hafetz Hayim: As Scripture says, “he shall restore what he took by robbery” (Lev.5:23). If a person seized by robbery something worth a perutah or more, he is to return it to the robbed person. If the robbed man has died, he is to return the seized object to the heirs. If the seized object is lost, he is to give its value in money. Included in this commandment there is also the duty of returning anything gained by theft or swindle. It applies everywhere and in every time for both men and women.
First of all, the definition of perutah is the smallest coin in the world of the ancient rabbis. Not only was it the smallest denomination of coin, but, as usual for the ancient world, it was also physically a small coin. The value of a coin was determined by the amount of the metal from which it was made. So larger coins were worth more than smaller ones.
Robbery is a crime. It is mentioned in the Bible and the penalty is, in some cases a fine of double the value of the stolen object if it is a moveable object. If it is cattle, the fine could increase to four or five times the value of the animal. No matter what the fine, the object that was stolen has to be returned to its owner. So, to be clear, robbery is not a mitzvah, but returning the seized object is. If the object is lost, than the value of the object is returned. And if the owner has died, it is to be returned to his heirs.
Finally, this law applies to all goods obtained illegally. If the object is not taken in an armed robbery but shoplifted, swiped, or gained by sleight of hand or by confusing the owner, than it still must be returned.
The point of all this is to insure that the person who stole the object could not benefit from his robbery. For example, if someone was the owner of a precious object and another offered him a fair price to buy it, but the owner declares that it is not for sale at any price since it has sentimental value. The buyer cannot steal it from the owner, and then pay the fine and keep the object. The object must also be returned. There is no difference if the object is valuable or not, one must return stolen goods.
This applies only to things that are moveable property. Real Estate that is stolen is a different category and the penalties are much higher since stealing property requires more effort. One must either move a boundary stone or pay witnesses to create a false bill of sale. Either way, it is a crime, in the bible against both human beings and G-d and a different set of laws applies.
This is a law designed to insure that “Crime does not pay”
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