In Honor and Memory of My Father and Teacher Leonard Konigsburg

On April 29, 2007 (11 Iyyar 5767) my father and my teacher, Leonard Konigsburg went to claim his portion in Olam Habah. I dedicate these lessons to my father who was an inspriation in my life and through his gentle teachings became the founder of the Konigsburg Rabbinic Dynasty.

Monday, October 22, 2007

3-5768: Mitzvah 72

Talmidav Shel Aharon
3-5768: Mitzvah 72
October 22, 2007

Mitzvah 72 – It is a positive commandment to upbraid a sinner
Hafetz Hayim: As Scripture says, “you shall surely rebuke your fellow.” (Lev. 19:17). He is to inform him that he does himself a wrong by his evil acts; and he is to inform him that he is telling hi this only for his own benefit, to bring him to life in the world-to-come. It is his duty to reprimand him until he listens to him, or until he strikes him and says “I will not listen to you.” There are some early authorities who are lenient about this, holding that it is enough until there is an angry retort [that the other gives us in rejecting our efforts]. But even the first view applies specifically when the person violates a prohibition by Torah law, and when he estimates that it will be effective for the future, that the other person will not do this thing again. Even a person of lower stature is duty-bound to rebuke a person of higher stature. Whoever has it in his power to oppose a sinner in his act and does not do so, fall victim to the guilt of is sin. Now, even though it is a religious duty to rebuke him [a sinner], he should not shame him first. It is a religious requirement to accept rebuke and to bear the chastiser affection. We find in the teachings of the Sages “that even if a person willfully violates a prohibition enacted by the Sages, it is permissible to call him a transgressor. It applies everywhere and in every time for both men and women.

This is a very difficult Mitzvah to perform because it has so many problems that can become attached to it. Let me first deal with the mechanics of the Mitzvah and then try and explain the problems.
This Mitzvah, on the surface is very straightforward. If we find someone whom we see is engaged in a violation of a Torah commandment, we have the obligation (not choice) to rebuke the actions of the person sinning and to try and get that person to do the right thing and not sin. It is so easy to sin and think that everyone is doing the same. When someone rebukes a sinner, that sinner can no longer think that his actions do not really matter. The idea is not to make anyone mad, but to get that person to contemplate his or her actions and to get them to do what is right. Such a person should really thank the one rebuking for saving his portion in the world to come. Additionally, it is possible to do a Mitzvah by mistake, but one must have intention to perform a sin. Rebuking a sinner forces that person to either change his or her ways or to affirm that it is his or her intention to sin, and thus they can no longer plead ignorance or error for their actions.
The first problem we detect with this Mitzvah is the intentions of the one who is doing the Rebuke. The rules of rebuking demand first of all, that the rebuke will have some effect on the Sinner. If the correction will be ignored, reviled or cause anger, than it is better to keep quiet and not rebuke. All the more so if the sinner is known to react violently to rebuke and could injure the one rebuking. Second, the one rebuking should have no vested interest in the sinner either continuing to sin or in changing his ways. If there is a hint of self-interest in the rebuke, someone else should do the rebuking. We don’t build ourselves up by tearing someone else down.
Not every sin is worthy of a rebuke. While we don’t try to rank one Mitzvah as being more important over another, note that the Hafetz Hayyim limits to rebuke to a violation of a Mitzvah from the Torah. Remember there is clear disagreement between Sages as to what some Mitzvot include. One does not rebuke another for following a different authority in Jewish law. So if a person does not hear the Shofar on Rosh Hashana one can “remind” that person that it is a Mitzvah to hear the Shofar. One should not, however, rebuke someone who is listening to the Shofar on Rosh Hashana, because he heard the Shofar in a synagogue where the one rebuking would not pray. Similarly one can rebuke someone who is eating forbidden meat, but not one who is eating food supervised by a Kashrut authority that the one who is rebuking does not accept.
There are authorities today, who feel that the whole rebuking process seems to be a very self-righteous way to act. There are many sinners today and rather than rebuke them, they should be treated as if they are someone who never had the chance to study and practice Jewish law. In other words, they are not sinners, just not fully aware of the complexities of Jewish law. Finally, no matter if one meets all the restrictions above and feels that, in this case, rebuke may help lift a person to live a better life, than rebuke may be given but always beware to give rebuke respectfully, honestly, sincerely and with great kindness. It should be a learning experience for the sinner and not ever be a source of embarrassment or shame. To shame a fellow human being is as close to committing murder as one can get without actually spilling blood. When we rebuke, we must carefully weigh and watch our words.

Monday, October 15, 2007

2-5768: Mitzvah 71

Talmidav Shel Aharon
2-5768: Mitzvah 71
October 15, 2007

Mitzvah 71 – It is a positive commandment to load with one’s fellow man, to set a burden on a domestic animal or on the person.
Hafetz Hayim: As Scripture says, “you shall surely help him lift them up.” (Deut. 22:4). If one left him and went his own way without helping him, he disobeyed a positive commandment. However, an elder for whom it is beneath his dignity is free of the duty. If, though, had it been his own he would have unloaded and loaded the burden, he is duty bound likewise with the burden of his fellow man. If he wishes to go beyond the strict letter of the law, he may unload or load it even if it is not in accord with his dignity; and may blessing come upon him.
If a person faced both the religious duty of unloading and the duty of loading, unloading takes priority because of the pain of the living creature. However, if the one needing his burden loaded was a person whom he disliked, and the other was a friend, it is a religious duty to help the disliked person first, so as to discipline his inclination. The disliked person mentioned here means someone whom he saw, when alone, committing a sing, whereupon he warned him but the other did not turn back. It is then a religious duty to hate him. Nevertheless he is to load and unload with him; for the other might delay on account of his items of monetary value and thus come into some danger. And it is proper to save him, since he does not believe I the main principles of our faith.
Loading is to be done specifically if the other pays him a fee for it; but for nothing there is no obligation to do loading. It applies everywhere and in every time for both men and women.
This Mitzvah is the flip side of the one from last week. There are two Mitzvot, one to help unload an animal that has fallen under its burden. That burden then needs to be reloaded, either in a different way so the animal can carry it, or onto another animal that may not have as much to carry or on the back of the owner.
Unloading always has priority since it also involves saving an animal from pain and suffering. Loading, however, is more about caring for our fellow human beings. Just like last week, an elder who does not want to sully his dignity does not have to help load the animal of another, but if he is traveling with aides, he can instruct them to help. If he also travels with animals and, from time to time has to reload them, then he must help others in need by the side of the road. If he has not reason to stop and stops anyway, this is acting above the letter of the law and such a man will be praised. People who are stuck on the side of the road are in grave danger of falling prey to robbers and vandals of all kind. To help them get back on their way is, in many cases, participating in saving a life.
There is also a special part of this Mitzvah that involves helping an enemy before a friend. Other sages note that when you stop to help an enemy load his animal, he may think that he has not judged you correctly and it is possible that the two of you may end the hard feelings between you. I have to pause here to comment on the Hafetz Hayim and his definition of an “enemy”. The definition he gives is one who sins in spite of being warned that such an action is prohibited. A person who spitefully sins is not the kind of person someone who loves G-d wants to be near. I am not sure that I would say that such a person should be “hated”. Many Sages insist that those who sin today are not acting out of spite for the law, rather they just don’t know any better. I also assume that this could be the only person the law would allow you to hate. Anger is permitted for a day or two, but we have a big Mitzvah to forgive those who offend us so that we do not hate them for long.
I am not sure what the rule is on being paid. I admit that this seems strange to me. I can only guess that since there were people who were paid to help load an animal that the owner of the load could try and bypass paying such people by doing it himself and when it fall apart anyway, expecting those who he meets on the road to retie the load for free. Thus if he is on the road, he still needs to pay those who help him load up the animal again.

Wednesday, October 10, 2007

1-5768: Mitzvah 70

Talmidav Shel Aharon
1-5768: Mitzvah 70
August 20, 2007

I am beginning now another year of my online study. What began as a lesson mailed to a few friends, is now a permanent blog with archives of all the previous lessons. I thank all of you who have taken the time to read and comment on my teachings for joining me in this study of Judaism and Jewish Law. May G-d bless our efforts in the New Year.

Mitzvah 70 – It is a positive commandment to unload fro the domestic animal of one’s fellow-human being that is lying under its burden.
Hafetz Hayim: As Scripture says, “if you see the donkey of one that you hate lying under its burden …you shall surely help with him.” (Exodus. 23:5). – even if there was on it a larger load that was fit for it. It is one’s duty to unload it for nothing, without payment. However, an elder for whom it is beneath his dignity is free of the obligation. If one unloaded and reloaded [the animal] and it fell down again, he is duty-bound to unload and load it back on yet another time, and even a hundred times, as Scripture says, “you shall surely help with him”. And he as to walk with him as far as a parasang {to make sure all is now in order] unless the owner of the load says, “I do not need you.” It applies everywhere and in every time for both men and women.

There are two different reasons for this Mitzvah. The first is an issue of Tzar Baalai Hayyim, or Kindness to Animals. Since animals were the main beasts of burden, (esp. donkeys) it is possible to load them up with more stuff than they are able to carry. If the animal can’t carry the load, it will collapse under the weight or just refuse to carry it. At the beginning or end of the journey, there will be helpers to load and unload the animal, but on the road, only the owner of the load or the owner of the animal (it could be the same person) is present and reloading the animal requires more than two hands. It is in the animal interest to have the load redistributed so that it is easier to carry or that some of the load be transferred to a stronger animal. The animal can’t talk to us, so it is a matter of trial and error, but we need to keep up the process until the animal can carry the load placed on its back.
The other reason for the mitzvah has to do with caring about our fellow human beings. We can’t just ignore a person in need. Even if that person is an enemy or one that we hate, we must stop and lend a hand. Perhaps it will lead to reconciliation, but even if it does not, we still have the responsibility to help. It is certain that if we do not help but just walk on by, we will not be making any new friends, and our enemies will hate us even more. We are not to ask for any pay for helping a person in distress. There are some who say that this therefore would apply to seeing a person who has a broken down car by the side of the road. We cannot just drive by, but must help change the tire or do what we can to help the person get back on the road. We become the roadside assistant that the other person needs. There is a danger her. It is well known that there are some nefarious people who use a broken down car to lure unsuspecting drivers to stop and be robbed or worse. But in the middle of the day in the middle of the city, others may drive by but we should at least stop and offer to call for help, as long as we don’t endanger ourselves.
The Hafetz Hayyim also notes that an elderly person or someone infirm or unable to help, does not need to stop and help with a job that is clearly beyond his or her capacities. We should stop and do what we can, even if it means only getting someone else to come and help.
A Parasang is a “Persian Mile” it equals 8,000 cubits or about 2.4 miles or 3.84 km.

Monday, August 20, 2007

35-5767: Mitzvah 69

Talmidav Shel Aharon
35-5767: Mitzvah 69
August 20, 2007

Mitzvah 69 – It is a positive commandment to return something lost to a member of Jewry
Hafetz Hayim: As Scripture says, “you shall surely bring them back to your brother” (Deut. 22:1). If one turned a blind eye to it, he disobeyed a positive commandment and violated a negative one. If he took the lost object and did not return it, he also disobeyed this positive commandment and violated two prohibitions. It is a religious duty to return a lost object even to a wicked person. But if someone eats non-Kosher meat out of spite and defiance, or he violates the Sabbath openly, he is a heretic, and it is forbidden to return a lost object to him. If a person finds something with which it would be beneath his dignity to bother, and were it his own he would not trouble himself with it, he has no duty to bother with this. If, however, he wishes to act beyond the strict line or letter of the law, he may do so, and may blessing come upon him. Now, Rabbenu Yona wrote: If it is a religious duty to devote effort to rescue another person’s items of monetary value, how much more certainly must we expend effort to rescue him himself, to do something to save him in his time of distress. It applies everywhere and in every time for both men and women.

In Judaism, one is not allowed to say, “I don’t want to get involved.” We have duties to G-d and we have duties to ourselves and we also have duties to our society. This is one of them. A lost object may be of little interest to me, but I can not just ignore it and walk on by. I have an obligation by this commandment to protect that which was lost and make a proper attempt to locate the owner. If the object is properly labeled with the name of the owner, I have to search out and find the owner and return his object in as good a condition as I found it. I can not allow it to become any more damaged than it already may be and, if I keep the object for any real length of time, and I am fixing my own similar objects, I should fix the lost property as well.
If the object found has no name on it, but it does have marks by which it can be identified, than we must publicize the finding of the object and ask those who would claim it as their own, to describe the identifying marks. For example, if jewelry were found, all that needs to be done is to announce that “a bracelet” was found and those who come to claim it can describe it in order to identify it.
If the object has no name on it or marks that could identify it, than I do not have the obligation to seek the owner. It is assumed that the owner has written it off as lost, and therefore it should be considered ownerless and the finder can keep it. For example, cash that is lost but not in a wallet or identifiable purse, that has no unusual marks on the bill, could not be returned because all money looks alike and there is no way to identify the true owner.
If the object is not worth saving, that is, it is so inconsequential that there is just no point in returning it, than we do not need to return it. If you find an old pair of beach shoes in the sand, and they could be identified but clearly the person who left them would not come back to find them, they could simply buy themselves a new pair, then we have no obligation for returning the object at all. If the owner did come and ask about it, it would probably be more charitable to buy him or her a new pair of shoes.
If I find an object that should be returned, and I don’t try to find the owner, I am in violation of this law and the law that insists that we don’t ignore the property of our neighbor. If I take the object and don’t seek the owner, I violate those laws and the law of robbery as well. I have kept something that does not belong to me.
The owner of the object does not matter. If we know who it belongs to, we have to return it, even if that person is our enemy, or if that person is wicked. As for the heretic, since he as separated himself from the community, he does not get the benefits of being a part of the community. The issue of eating treif meat or violating Shabbat should not be taken literally since these are very subjective Mitzvot. You may not keep my level of Kashrut or do what I do on Shabbat but that does not make one a heretic. If one denies G-d, than such a person is outside the community. As a Conservative Jew, I am not so sure that I would be so quick to brand someone a heretic or not to return an object that was once owned by a non-Jew. In all cases, retuning lost property is a great Mitzvah and even if we don’t have the obligation to return it, if we do so, we are praised for going above the letter of the law. At the end, we are reminded that if it is so important that we return lost property to a person, how much more important it must be if we save a person from distress, danger and trouble. We just cannot sit by and let someone else save the person. The only restriction on this is if saving someone else would endanger out lives. We are not obligated to save anyone or anything if, by saving him, her or it, we would be endangering our lives.

Wednesday, August 15, 2007

34-5767: Mitzvah 68

Talmidav Shel Aharon
34-5767: Mitzvah 68
August 14, 2007

Mitzvah 68 – It is a positive commandment to return whatever one has taken in robbery.
Hafetz Hayim: As Scripture says, “he shall restore what he took by robbery” (Lev.5:23). If a person seized by robbery something worth a perutah or more, he is to return it to the robbed person. If the robbed man has died, he is to return the seized object to the heirs. If the seized object is lost, he is to give its value in money. Included in this commandment there is also the duty of returning anything gained by theft or swindle. It applies everywhere and in every time for both men and women.

First of all, the definition of perutah is the smallest coin in the world of the ancient rabbis. Not only was it the smallest denomination of coin, but, as usual for the ancient world, it was also physically a small coin. The value of a coin was determined by the amount of the metal from which it was made. So larger coins were worth more than smaller ones.

Robbery is a crime. It is mentioned in the Bible and the penalty is, in some cases a fine of double the value of the stolen object if it is a moveable object. If it is cattle, the fine could increase to four or five times the value of the animal. No matter what the fine, the object that was stolen has to be returned to its owner. So, to be clear, robbery is not a mitzvah, but returning the seized object is. If the object is lost, than the value of the object is returned. And if the owner has died, it is to be returned to his heirs.

Finally, this law applies to all goods obtained illegally. If the object is not taken in an armed robbery but shoplifted, swiped, or gained by sleight of hand or by confusing the owner, than it still must be returned.

The point of all this is to insure that the person who stole the object could not benefit from his robbery. For example, if someone was the owner of a precious object and another offered him a fair price to buy it, but the owner declares that it is not for sale at any price since it has sentimental value. The buyer cannot steal it from the owner, and then pay the fine and keep the object. The object must also be returned. There is no difference if the object is valuable or not, one must return stolen goods.

This applies only to things that are moveable property. Real Estate that is stolen is a different category and the penalties are much higher since stealing property requires more effort. One must either move a boundary stone or pay witnesses to create a false bill of sale. Either way, it is a crime, in the bible against both human beings and G-d and a different set of laws applies.
This is a law designed to insure that “Crime does not pay”

Tuesday, July 31, 2007

33-5767: Mitzvah 67

Talmidav Shel Aharon
33-5767: Mitzvah 67
July 30, 2007

Mitzvah 67 – It is a positive commandment to render judgement on matters of buying and selling.
Hafetz Hayim: By the rule that the Torah ordained about it. This is to say that there are situations where a transaction between seller and buyer remains valid, and situations where it has no validity; and an obligation lies upon us to judge between them according to the instruction of the Torah. A specific commandment is given about this in a specific portion [of Scripture]: “and if you sell something to your fellow or buy from your fellow’s hand, etc. (Lev. 25:14) – because it [trade] is a constant thing among human beings, without which it is impossible for people to live even one day. Land can be acquired as one’s possession through money, a document, or demonstration of ownership; and moveable goods or a domestic animal by drawing {it to oneself] and all the more certainly by lifting it, and so forth. It applies everywhere and in every time.

This one surprised me for a couple of reasons. It is the first we have encountered that does not have a “proof text” from the Bible and the text that it does quote only makes the point of this Mitzvah more confused. Is this a Mitzvah only for judges, or for appraisers or does it apply to everyone, (note the conclusion does not include people).
Let me start with the quote from Leviticus 25:14. I need to give you the rest of the quote because, for some reason, the Hafetz Hayim does not quote the entire verse let alone the section in which it sits. Let me quote the section:
“When you sell property to your neighbor, or buy any from your neighbor, you shall not wrong one another. In buying from your neighbor, you shall deduct only for the number of years since the jubilee; and in selling to you, he shall charge you only for the remaining crop years; the more years, the higher the price; for what he is selling you is a number of harvests. Do no wrong one another, but fear your G-d; for I am the Lord your G-d.”
This is from Parshat Behar and speaks of the Jubilee year when land returned to its original owner. In a technical sense, the land was never sold, but leased for the number of years until it had to be returned. We see, in this case, there has to be a determination as to how many years are left until the land must be returned. Since we are talking about crop years, with the assumption that farming is the purpose of buying (leasing) the land, the number of years will depend on which crop is being planted and what time of year the sale takes place. This would mean that the Hafetz Hayim would be referring to land and the jubilee year only, and clearly he is not.
Perhaps since he is talking about buying and selling, he expands the mitzvah to include moveable property as well as cattle. The laws concerning buying and selling are very long and complicated and I have only a modest understanding of them. Part of the reason for this is because, under Jewish Law, when there is a conflict between Jewish law and civil law, in the case of monetary laws, we follow the law of the land and not Jewish law.
It seems more likely that the Hafetz Hayim is referring to all the laws of transactions here. The mitzvah is to make sure that all transactions are performed properly. In the case of land, to have a valid transaction you have to hand money for the land over to the seller in front of two or more witnesses, or you can draw up a contract, and by taking possession of the contract in front of witnesses, or a demonstration of ownership, that means putting up a fence, hoeing, locking the premises or putting down a mattress to sleep or any other act that would show that this person is the owner. (I note here that since a Ketubah, a marriage contract, transfers ownership of part of the grooms land to the wife in the event that he should predecease her, that the rules of transaction by contract, that is the need for witnesses and the placing of the Ketubah in her hands, is necessary and therefore a part of the wedding ceremony)
In the case of moveable property or animals, the actual object has to moved into the domain of the buyer. It can be carried there, or, in the case of animals, “pulled” there. If it is not practical to move the object, the buyer, lifting it from its place, can acquire it. There are other technical ways to acquire objects, such as using a handkerchief, or in some cases, the transfer of money. What I think the Mitzvah here is to be one of the witnesses to the transaction and therefore enable business to go on as usual. Without witnesses, business would grind to a halt and everyone would suffer.
This could explain why the Mitzvah is so unusual. While we are “commanded” to do this, it could involve a great deal of inconvenience. Rabbis would want to insure that commerce goes on but the requirement part of this seems to be very tenuous.
I invite any of my readers who have a deeper understanding of the laws of acquisition in Judaism to attach their comments if it would help clarify this Mitzvah.

Monday, July 16, 2007

32-5767: Mitzvah 66

Talmidav Shel Aharon
32-5767: Mitzvah 66
July 16, 2007

Mitzvah 66 – It is a positive commandment to give the wages of a hired hand on the same day.
Hafetz Hayim: As Scripture says: “On his day you shall give him his hire” (Deut. 24:15) To a “resident stranger” ( who has committed himself to observe the seven commandments of Noah) this law also applies, that “on his day you shall give him his hire.” It applies everywhere and in every time for both men and women.

I believe that this law is the source of the maxim: An honest days pay for an honest days work. That is the fundamental ethic behind this Mitzvah. If someone does work for you, they are entitled to be paid. The Mitzvah also insists that the payment should be given on the same day the work is done.
The importance of this law seems obvious. A day laborer depends on his pay to support himself and his family. To withhold that pay, or to make him or her wait to be paid, would cause needless suffering. It would also leave the laborer with little recourse to get his money later. Such day laborers do not have the resources to sue the employer for their wages. By the time the matter gets to court, the entire family could be starving. These workers are some of the most vulnerable in society. They are at the bottom of the labor hierarchy; The Sages passed many laws to protect them. One was last weeks Mitzvah, that they be given opportunities to snack on the job. This one adds the protection that they will be paid promptly.
I apply this mitzvah to all small business owners who go out and try to offer a service to the community. The gardeners, the pool technicians, the handyman and the roof repairman are all basically in business for themselves and depend on being paid promptly. If they accept a credit card, the bill is paid on the spot. If they are used to sending a monthly bill, I direct the bill pay at my bank to pay them as soon as the bill arrives and not wait 30 days to send payment. Large corporations, the power company, the mortgage company, the city water bureau, and the credit card companies I pay just prior to the due date, but not the “little guys.” The Torah teaches us that they deserve a break and should be paid, if possible, the same day. The Talmud records a dispute between such laborers and a wealthy landowner. He withheld payment and seized the workers garments because they were moving barrels of wine and broke one, causing him a loss. The workers took the man to court and the court insisted that their garments be returned, since they did not intend to break the barrel, it was just an accident and they could not be held liable for accidental damages. The court also demanded that they be paid for the day. The landowner was incensed that they had caused him damage and now he hand to pay them too! Still the court insisted that they had done their best that day and deserved to be paid.